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Abstract
Nonreflexive quantummechanics is a formulation of quantum theory based on a non-
classical logic termed nonreflexive logic (a.k.a. ‘non-reflexive’). In these logics, the
standard notion of identity, as encapsulated in classical logic and set theories, does
not hold in full. The basic aim of this kind of approach to quantum mechanics is to
take seriously the claim made by some authors according to whom quantum particles
are non-individuals in some sense, and also to take into account the fact that they
may be absolutely indistinguishable (or indiscernible). The nonreflexive formulation
of quantum theory assumes these features of the objects already at the level of the
underlying logic, so that no use is required of symmetrization postulates or other
mathematical devices that serve to pretend that the objects are indiscernible (when
they are not: all objects that obey classical logic are individuals in a sense). Here,
we present the ideas of the development of nonreflexive quantum mechanics and
discuss some philosophical (mainly metaphysical) motivations and consequences of
it.
1 Introduction
Indiscernibility of physical systems (or physical objects) appear already in classical
physics. For instance, in 1808 John Dalton, the founder of modern atomism, claimed
that there would be no differences among chemical elements of a same kind: “we
may conclude that the ultimate particles of all homogeneous bodies are perfectly
alike in weight, figure, etc.” [6, p.142-3]. In 1900, Max Planck, still reasoning within
the scope of classical physics, made the fundamental move to quantum mechanics
by assuming that in distributing an integral number N of energy elements over C
states, the indiscernibility of the elements should be taken into account. Planck’s
formula
Z =
(N + C − 1)!
N !(C − 1)!
∗ Partially supported by CNPq.
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shows that the division by N ! makes the trick. Some years before, the so-called
Gibbs paradox appeared in classical statistical mechanics showing that indiscernible
particles are not only part of the physics, but also of the philosophical problem
concerning the proper understanding of how an appropriate metaphysics for physical
theories would look like. Indeed, should we take the natural approach suggested by
the Sackur-Tetrode formula for the entropy of an ideal gas and accept that nature
made particles indistinguishable and that there is no more talking about the topic?
Or should we adopt a minimalist approach and concede that indistinguishability
may help us in drawing the line between classical and quantum particles (see French
and Krause [10, chap.2])? The first route would blur the difference between classical
and quantum particles, both being absolutely indistinguishable in some cases. In the
second case, we may argue that classical particles are different from their quantum
counterparts for they may be considered to be individuals and distinguishable in
some sense, while the matter is not so easily settled for quantum particles, which,
due to their indiscernibility, may be taken as some kind of non-individuals.
The word ‘non-individuals’ has an historical use. Several forerunners of quantum
theory have referred to quantum objects this way, mainly in the sense that quantum
particles “are not individuals”, as suggested by Schrödinger [21, p.206]. But the term
‘non-individual’ may confuse the reader in suggesting that these entities would be
something different from that which we can refer to or speak about. In fact, we don’t
know in precise terms what they are. Each theory gives its own characteristics to
these entities (B. Falkenburg traces the ‘metamorphoses’ of the term ‘particle’ from
classical physics to the most advanced physical theory of today [8, Chap.6]). Being
non-individuals does not prevent quantum particles from being able to be isolated
by some time, but that they cannot be regarded as individuals in the standard
sense of the word, as something that have an identity and can be identified in other
times even if mixed with others of similar species. As it is well known, this does
not happen with quantum particles. It is in this sense that we say that all protons
are absolutely indiscernible, so are all electrons, all neutrons, and do on. Hence, all
atoms of the same chemical isotope, made from protons, neutrons and electrons, are
also indiscernible. Without this hypothesis, chemistry does not work, and quantum
physics does not work either.
We shall take the second approach mentioned earlier and concede that there is a
significant difference between quantum and classical particles. In classical mechanics
we can at least in principle follow well-defined trajectories for each particle and
by adding a reasonable assumption concerning their impenetrability we may grant
that some form of spatio-temporal principle of individuality holds. When we turn to
quantum mechanics, on the other hand, things get much more complicated; in fact,
for quantum particles there is no trajectory in the classical sense, unless a hidden-
variables approach is followed, which has its own shortcomings; the impenetrability
assumption is also unavailable, for it may happen that particles are in entangled
states. More than that, quantum mechanics encapsulates indistinguishability in the
statistical treatment of aggregates of particles through the famous Bose-Einstein
and Fermi-Dirac statistics. These are seen as grounding the fact that in some cases
nothing whatsoever may distinguish quantum particles, for as is famously remarked,
permutations of particles do not count in this statistics as giving rise to different
states.
One of the difficulties with this fact — quantum indistinguishability as obtained
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through the statistics of the theory — concerns precisely the relationship between
the experimental fact that is being expressed and its mathematical formulation.
Experimentally, it is found that there are situations in which one cannot distinguish
between two particles of the same kind, as the theory predicts; mathematically,
though, since the formalism of the theory is constructed within classical set theory
using a part of functional analysis, the indistinguishability must be brought into
the theory through the assumption of some symmetry conditions that grant us
the desired effect. In a standard set theory, let us emphasize, whenever we have two
objects, they are necessarily discernible: they are distinct. Now, from a philosophical
point of view the assumption of these symmetry conditions seems to be at odds with
the idea of genuinely indistinguishable entities, for it seems to be a mechanism to
mask the fact that the entities dealt with are not really indistinguishable, since they
belong to classical logic and set theory (see the discussions in Krause and Arenhart
[14]).
The difficulty involving standard mathematics and logic and their relation to ‘gen-
uine’ indistinguishability can be expressed in a nutshell as follows: on the one hand,
orthodox quantum mechanics says that there are situations according to which we
cannot discern the quanta; on the other hand, within classical mathematics, we rep-
resent this fact using symmetry postulates, whose aim is to mask the fact that in
standard logic and mathematics one can always know that wherever there are two
items, they are discernible by purely logical means inside set theory. We may even
opt for a realistic interpretation according to which, even conceding indistinguisha-
bility, the particles remain there with their hidden properties, and even in this case
there is no way to tell them apart. So, concerning this situation, three options seem
to be available: (i) either the problem concerns the relationship between the enti-
ties dealt with by QM and standard mathematics, so that those entities may not sit
comfortably together with assumptions made in classical mathematics, or (ii) there
is some kind of hidden variable which may confer individuality to quantum entities,
but, being hidden, is not taken into account by the standard formalism, or (iii) the
quanta must be treated mathematically as certain entities which are discernible but
their discernibility cannot be expressed in qualitative terms by the vocabulary of
the theory. Perhaps the last two may be seen as just one option, but nothing in
principle prevents us from distinguishing them. In fact, (ii) allows that in principle
we could extend the formalism to accommodate the hidden variables accounting
for the individuality, something (iii) in this reading does not allow for; in this last
case the individuality is there but the theory does not allow us to express how it is
constituted.
All these options present their own challenges; after briefly discussing items (ii)
and (iii) in sections 2 and 3, we turn to the first one. This is perhaps the place
to say that we are not claiming that QM violates standard mathematics and logic;
our point is that it seems that this theory can be formulated in different and non
equivalent ways, most of them within these ‘classical’ frameworks. In saying that,
we are not assuming that there is just one QM, we take it as a fact that there are
different formulations of different theories which are empirically equivalent. What
we intent to do is to explore an alternative approach and look for the (at least
conceptual) gains we may have. As we shall see in section 4, there is an alternative
formulation/construction of quantum mechanics that incorporates non-individuality
right from the start and makes use of this fact in order to develop the formalism
of the theory. It is our goal here to render this formulation more easily accessible
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and clear. Once that is done, the philosophical view that quantum particles are not
individuals (along with some simple logical theory of quasi-set) is seen as giving
rise to fruitful developments of the theory itself, as an instance of a kind of reflexive
equilibrium procedure: the standard mathematical formulation and experiments
suggest that quantum particles are not individuals; however, that mathematical
apparatus does not reflect that non-individuality, so, we use that fact in order to
develop a mathematical formalism that takes non-individuality into account; this
formalism, now, gives rise to another version of quantum mechanics. We discuss
this view in section 5.
2 Indistinguishability as a quantum phenomenon
To better understand the reasons why quantum particles are considered to be ab-
solutely indistinguishable and how that absolute individuality is supposed to lead
to their non-individuality, we may start by comparing quantum and classical statis-
tics. This is the standard trope on this issue, and we believe it is a good strat-
egy to be followed, because since we have no access to the particles themselves, it
seems that their collective behavior may give us some clues as to their identity and
(in)distinguishability (see French and Krause [10, chap.4]).
The first point to be noticed is that there is some sense in which both classical
and quantum particles are taken to be indistinguishable: when they share all their
intrinsic (or state independent) properties. Sometimes it is common to call particles
sharing all their intrinsic properties ‘identical particles’. However, this is just an
abuse of language to say that the particles are of the same kind. The similarities
among quantum and classical stop there, however. The main feature behind the
claim that classical particles are individuals after all and that they are not really
indistinguishable in the same sense that quantum particles are said to be concerns
their collective behavior; the way that classical statistical mechanics describes ag-
gregates of classical particles differs significantly from the way quantum mechanics
describes aggregates of quantum particles.
Classical particles behave collectively according to Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics
(MB). Let us illustrate it by considering the particular case in which there are two
particles, labeled 1 and 2, to be distributed in two different states, A and B. Then,
according to MB statistics, we can have the following cases:
1. A(1) and A(2);
2. B(1) and B(2);
3. A(1) and B(2);
4. A(2) and B(1).
Assuming the equiprobability hypothesis — the claim that none of these cases has
more chances to occur than the others (a claim not without its difficulties, see
French and Krause [10, chap. 2]) — implies that all these possibilities are assigned
the same weight, that is, 1
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, and despite being considered as indistinguishable in the
sense discussed above, permutations of particles, as it happens in the cases 3 and
4, are counted as giving rise to distinct possibilities. Here lies the key where the
alleged difference between classical and quantum particles concerning identity and
individuality matters.
The fact that permutations should bee seen as giving rise to different situations is
generally taken to witness for their individuality. In fact, even though the particles
share all their intrinsic properties, this simple fact seems to speak in favor of some
individuality being manifested by the particles as they are permuted. Their indi-
viduality accounts for the difference in cases 3 and 4. Another way to put it is in
terms involving state descriptions as describing a possible world: a permutation of
particles in case 3 leads to a distinct possible world, one in which it is particle 2 that
is in A and 1 in B. What accounts for the differences in the two worlds? Not the
properties of the particles, assuming them indiscernible. So, it must be the case that
they have an individuality intrinsic to them that is responsible for this possibility.
That individuality can be understood in terms of some underlying substratum, a
haecceity, or even more simply in terms of the trajectories (spatio-temporal loca-
tion) with the impenetrability assumption of which we have already spoken about
earlier (see, for instance, Ladyman [16] for a discussion in those terms).
In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, nothing like this happens. To keep with
the case of two particles labeled once again 1 and 2 distributed in states A and
B, we have two cases, one for bosons and other for fermions. For the bosons, the
following possibilities obtain:
1. A(1) and A(2);
2. B(1) and B(2);
3. A(*) and B(*).
Again assuming equiprobability for each of these cases, each of them will have the
same probability of 1
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to occur. Notice that in case 3 we have employed ∗ instead of
the particles labels; that accounts for the distinctive feature of quantum statistics:
the fact that permutations do not give rise to a distinct situation. The ∗ then means
one particle in A and one in B. The same idea can be used for Fermi-Dirac statistics,
the one employed for fermions:
1. A(*) and B(*).
For fermions, as for bosons, permutations change nothing, but differently from
bosons, the fermions obey the famous Pauli Exclusion Principle, which roughly
speaking grants that no two fermions can occupy the same state; thus there is only
one option in this particular case. The great novelty of quantum statistics comes
from the fact that permutations do not give rise to distinct states. In terms of the
description involving possible worlds above, a permutation does not give rise to a
distinct world. Contrarily to the classical case, there is nothing in the particles to
ground the fact that the situation before the permutation is distinct from the situ-
ation after the permutation. Thus, they are the same situation. As a consequence,
there is no intrinsic individuality principle doing that job.
Obviously, if that kind of reasoning is going to ground the claim that quantum
particles have no individuality and are really indistinguishable, as we wish it to do,
then it must be recognized that our language is inadequate to express that fact,
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for we began by labeling the particles, which amounts to individuate and identify
them (something we cannot do for absolutely indistinguishable items), and then
we were forced to ‘forget’ the labels and place an ∗ in their place to neutralize
the fact that if a label was allowed in the counting we would have intuitively the
same classical statistics given by Maxwell-Boltzmann. Now, this is precisely the
conundrum between the “nature” of quantum particles and the language we use to
talk about them. To deal more properly with this topic, let us see how the formalism
of quantum mechanics deals with the statistics. This will help us to appreciate the
relevance of the alternative formulation of quantum mechanics we introduce later.
3 The standard way to deal with indistinguishable objects
in QM
We would like to emphasize that in standard approaches to the formalism of quan-
tum mechanics, given inside some classical set theory, quanta are individuals (as
entities represented either by sets or by ur-elements) whose individuality is veiled
by symmetry principles that are added by hand. In fact, the standard formalism of
quantum mechanics masks the individuality of the particles through the use of a
mathematical trick: one begins with labelled individuals (particles 1 and 2, say) and
by convenient manipulation, a clever postulate mimics the behavior of indiscernible
non-individuals, say by means of symmetric and anti-symmetric vectors/functions.
The price to be paid for the use of such a manœuvre is mainly philosophical, since
physics works for all practical purposes: one wants to be committed with an ontology
of non-individuals, but in the end, all we are left with are the same old individuals
we started with, clothed as non-individuals by the symmetry postulates asserting
the invariance of their permutability. Let us see precisely how it is done, for when we
know what we wish to avoid, it is then easier to fully appreciate what is gained by
the use of the Q-spaces introduced below. Also, this way of approaching quantum
mechanics, through the use of labels (we don’t know how to proceed without them
within such standard mathematical frameworks) is one of the signs of individuality.
Consider the quantum statistics mentioned above. To each particle 1 and 2 we
associate a Hilbert space H1 and H2 respectively. If the particles are indiscernible,
these spaces are in fact the same for both. For the system composed by both particles
we associate the tensor productH1⊗H2. As is usual, we write a typical vector of this
space by |ψ1〉 ⊗ |ψ2〉, or simply |ψ1〉|ψ2〉 for short. Then, the possibilities available
for the particles 1 and 2 in states A and B are stated as the following:
1. |ψA
1
〉|ψA
2
〉
2. |ψB1 〉|ψB2 〉
3. 1√
2
(|ψA
1
〉|ψB
2
〉 ± |ψA
2
〉|ψB
1
〉).
We are here simplifying the notation: the third case splits in two, according to
whether we deal with bosons or fermions; for bosons, we have cases 1-3 with a plus
sign in the last one (symmetric vector), for fermions we only have the third pos-
sibility, now with the minus sign (anti-symmetric vector). What really matters is
that to obtain the correct statistics one must employ symmetric and anti-symmetric
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vectors. This is the first part of the trick: label the particles and write the appropri-
ate states, that is, symmetrical for bosons and anti-symmetrical for fermions. This
means in particular that the asymmetrical states |ψA1 〉|ψB2 〉 and |ψA2 〉|ψB1 〉, like the
ones employed in classical statistics, are not taken in consideration.1 Notice that
the use of these states allows us to distinguish between the particles: we are able
to attribute specific states to each one of them, although indiscernible (this is one
way to substantiate the claim that quantum particles are indiscernible individuals;
see French and Krause [10, chap.4] for the details).
But how can we make sure that only the states with the appropriate symmetry types
are available? That is the second part of the trick, and it consists in postulating that
only the appropriately symmetrized states obtain. The famous Indistinguishability
Postulate (IP) does just this job:
〈ψ12|Oˆ|ψ12〉 = 〈Pψ21|Oˆ|Pψ21〉. (1)
What this principle says, roughly speaking, is that the result of a measurement
before and after a permutation of the labels of particles results in the same quantity,
so, permuting the labels amounts to no physical difference at all. In fact, a more
technical reading of IP says that only observables compatible with the permutation
operators P (the ones whose purpose is to permute the labels given to the particles)
are allowed. This amounts to the following relation:
[OˆP, P Oˆ] = OˆP − POˆ = 0 (2)
As one can check, only symmetrical and anti-symmetrical states satisfy these con-
ditions. There is a whole discussion on what are the grounds to postulate IP and
to accept it, and the different readings of this principle that may be compatible
with it; in one of them, for example, which makes it weaker, the asymmetric states
are not banned, but remain simply inaccessible to the particles (as we mentioned
previously). In this last case, the particles may be regarded as individuals of some
kind, but we shall not enter into these discussions here (but see French and Krause
[10, chap.4] for further discussions). We just remark that this possibility shows that
quantum particles can be considered as individuals too! (But, as we are trying to
show, this is not the better way to see them).2
So, this is in short how the trick is done in the standard formalism of quantum
mechanics: to grant that permutations of particles do not give rise to different
states, that is, to grant that the particles are absolutely indiscernible, one begins by
labeling them in the first place, and then, by using only certain symmetrized vectors
and by imposing a condition that only these vectors represent physical states, we
achieve the desired result.
Each of these steps has its own difficulties for the philosopher interested in a com-
mitment with ‘real’ indistinguishable entities, in particular for a defense of a meta-
physics of nonindividuals. Really, to begin with, by assuming that there is some
1. They constitute surplus formal structures, according to a terminology introduced by M. Red-
head, that is, elements of the formalism corresponding to nothing in the real world (see [23, p.25]).
2. In fact, quantum physics also can (and is) be developed within a standard set theory which
comprises individuals; as we have already remarked, physics works fine, but the philosophical
problems turn to light.
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sense in labeling particles, we may consider them to have well defined identity con-
ditions, for one of them was labeled 1 and the other was labeled 2. This idea runs
counter to the whole enterprise being pursued, that is, that the particles must be
really indiscernible. As they are generally understood, labels seem to demand a
semantic theory committed with individuals and identity.
Here it would be interesting to comment that even the Fock space formalism (which
will be deal with below) is not completely free from initially attached labels, as
Redhead and Teller have claimed (see [23]). In fact, in their usual construction, they
begin with labeled Hilbert spaces (spaces H1 and H2, as we have been discussing);
so, even if in the final presentation of a Fock space the labels are not mentioned,
we need labels in Hilbert spaces for the usual constructions of the Fock spaces. The
trick is not, after all, dispensed with! This criticism justifies our approach in the
next section to construct Fock spaces inside a nonreflexive system of logic in which
none of the mentioned tricks is required. We begin with indiscernible objects and
build from there.
Note: — in fact, for n indistinguishable particles, one takes the same Hilbert space
n times. But this does not eliminate the trick, for we still work with vectors of the
form |n1, n2, . . . , nk〉, representing a state with ni quantum particles with a certain
eigenvalue in a certain state (which would attest only to the quantity of them but
not their individuality). In pursuing the details, however, we need to go back to sets
and individuals. There is no scape within standard mathematics!
4 The Q-spaces
In order to avoid the (even hidden) assumption that we need to start with individ-
uals, we introduce the notion of Q-spaces. We begin with an outline of quasi-set
theory, the framework within which we develop our nonreflexive quantum mechan-
ics.
4.1 Basic quasi-set theory Q
Quasi-set theory is a ZFU-like first-order set theory comprising two kinds of atoms:3
the M-atoms, which behave like ZFU atoms and are denoted in the language with
the help of a unary predicateM , and the m-atoms, which satisfy the unary predicate
m. For the last kind of atoms identity is not defined, for according to our intuitive
interpretation of the theory, we attribute to them the role of quantum particles:
they must be not only indistinguishable, but more than that, identity statements
must not make sense for them. To grant that both goals are achieved, that is, that
there is one kind of objects that can be related by an indistinguishability relation
and be such that identity and difference statements do not make sense for them, we
must in Q depart from some of the original ZFU features. Let us check briefly how
it can be done (for more details, see [10, chap.7], [11]).
3. We work with atoms because it seems to be more intuitive to regard physical objects not as sets.
As is well known, atoms are entities that can belong to sets, but which have no elements (in the
sense of the membership relation), yet they could be composed of other entities in a mereological
sense. The problem is that a quantum mereology was not developed yet – regarding mereology, see
[22]; concerning some problems related to a quantum mereology, see [12].
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Note: — before we begin with the theory, let us make another general remark. Why
to advance the thesis that the notion of identity is senseless for the objects denoted
by the m-atoms? The problem is that, if we assume that they obey the traditional
theory of identity of classical logic (and set theory), once we have two of them, they
are necessarily different. Well, in this case, they must have some difference, given
by a property (since we are, as usual, avoiding to suppose notions of substratum)!
Well, either the physical theory presents this property or not. In the first case,
the entities could not be indiscernible; in the second case, the difference would be
hidden in the underlying logic, but even so it needs to be regarded as existing. Then
we have again two cases: either logic (or set theory) shows us the property or it
does not. In both cases the entities turn to be individuals — we remark that even in
standard mathematics there are entities (real numbers, say) that are different but
whose difference cannot be described by the theory (an example would be the two
least elements of two disjoint sets of real numbers) according to a given well-order,
which can be assumed to exist in the presence of the axiom of choice, but which
cannot be described by a formula of the theory of sets).
Let us begin with the underlying logic of Q: it is first-order logic without identity.
From a syntactical point of view, the postulates of this logic are the same as those
of classical logic, but semantically they are understood differently. To understand
this restriction one needs only to remember that classical semantics is developed
inside a classical set theory like ZFC. If this kind of semantics were employed to the
underlying logic of Q, then we would be committing ourselves with precisely those
features of classical logic we want to avoid, namely, that identity makes sense for
every object and indistinguishability relations collapse in identity. Quantifier must
be understood with some reservation: ∀xϕ(x) is to be not read as ‘for each object of
the domain’, which would entail their identification, but simply as ‘for all objects of
the domain’, meaning precisely this: for all objects of the domain. Similarly, ∃xϕ(x)
means that some object of the domain satisfies the formula ϕ(x), and we need not
to identify it, say by a name; for details, see [1],[2].
Besides atoms, the theory is designed to grant that we can build collections. By
definition, a quasi-set (q-set for short) is something that is not an atom, and we
distinguish them for they obey a primitive unary predicate Q; that is, Q(x) indicates
that x is a q-set. Such collections are assumed to be formed in stages, as it happens
in the classical cumulative hierarchy; for some of these collections, in some step m-
atoms may be involved as member, but for others it may happen that no m-atom
appear in any step of the formation of the q-set. To designate this last kind of q-set
we introduce the primitive predicate Z, denoting what we call a classical q-set, or
simply a set, and they turn to be copies of the sets of ZFU. Technically speaking,
sets are collections with no m-atoms in their transitive closure. We call the M-atoms
and sets classical things of the theory. When restricted to the classical things, Q
allows us to develop all the standard mathematics that can be developed inside
ZFU.
Identity must be introduced by definition. This fact allows us to manufacture an
identity relation restricted to q-sets and M-atoms only, but not holding among m-
atoms (to fit the intuitive interpretation we have attributed them). The definition
is the following:
Definition 4.1 x = y := (Q(x)∧Q(y)∧∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y))∨(M(x)∧M(y)∧∀z(x ∈
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z ↔ y ∈ z)).
According to the definition, equal q-sets are those that have the same members,
and equal M-atoms are those that belong to the same q-sets. If there are m-atoms
involved, since the notion of identity does not make sense to them, it may be the
case that we are unable to effectively know whether two q-sets are identical, for we
have no means to identify their elements. But things here work in the conditional:
if two q-sets have the same elements, then they are identical and reciprocally.4
One can easily prove from this definition that identity is reflexive, and the sub-
stitution law is postulated as an axiom; then, identity (where it holds) has both
properties that characterize it in first-order systems. What about indistinguisha-
bility? We postulate that it has the properties of an equivalence relation (i.e. it is
reflexive, symmetric and transitive), but it is not compatible with the membership
relation, that is, from x ≡ y and x ∈ z we cannot always derive that y ∈ z; this
is done in order to grant that identity and indistinguishability do not collapse in
the same concept. For the other properties P of the language, though, we have that
if x ≡ y and P (x), then P (y). Also, for the classical things, identity and indistin-
guishability are equivalent.
The construction of q-sets proceeds in much the same way as in ZFU: by the iterated
application of well-known set theoretical operations as power set, union, cartesian
product, among others. One difference that is worth mentioning concerns the notion
of unordered pair; in Q we cannot proceed as in the usual set theories, postulating
that for every x and y there is a collection of objects equal to either x or y, and the
reason is simple: for m-atoms identity is not defined, so that to restrict ourselves
to the classical definition would amount to the impossibility of pairs of m-atoms,
something undesirable in a theory of collections. To mend the situation, the theory
encompasses an unordered pair axiom stating that for every two items x and y
there is a q-set z containing them as elements (as in the classical case, there may
be other elements in z as well). We then apply the separation axiom (which has its
quasi-set theoretical version similar to the classical formulation) to a q-set z and
separate a ‘pair’, in fact, which is the q-set of the elements of z containing only those
elements that are indistinguishable from either x or y. This collection is denoted
[x, y]z; if x ≡ y holds, then we write simply [x]z and call it the weak singleton
of x. Notice that, intuitively speaking, the quantity of elements in weak pairs and
weak singletons may be higher than 2 and 1 respectively, for z may contain many
elements indistinguishable from x and/or y.
From unordered pairs we can then define a weak version of ordered pairs as follows,
which stands for the q-set of the items indistinguishable from x and from y that
belong to z:
Definition 4.2 (Weak ordered pair) 〈x, y〉z := [[x]z, [x, y]z ]z
Of course, any binary relation (or q-relation as we shall see) involving only m-atoms
is symmetric for 〈x, y〉z = 〈y, x〉z. Then, the definition of cartesian product follows
as usual:
4. We recall Bertrand Russell’s definition of pure mathematics (and Q is the pure counterpart of
our quantum mechanics) as the class of propositions of the form ‘p implies q’, given in his The
Principles of Mathematics.
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Definition 4.3 (Cartesian Product) z × w := [〈x, y〉z∪w : x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ w]
If there are only m-atoms involved, then z × w = w × z for all z and w, as is easy
to see. The theory has also a union axiom which works as in standard set theories;
so, we shall use the symbols ∪ and ∩ taken then from granted from now on.
Definition 4.4 (Quasi-relation) A q-set R is a binary quasi-relation between q-
sets z and w if its elements are weak ordered pairs of the form 〈x, y〉z∪w, with x ∈ z
and y ∈ w.
Now, for quasi-functions we cannot proceed as usual, for the classical concept of
function uses the notion of identity. To generalize the usual concept, then, and
allow that it applies also for q-sets of m-atoms, we require that a mapping does not
attribute different kinds of values to indistinguishable arguments. Thus, we have:
Definition 4.5 (Quasi-function) f is a quasi-function among q-sets A and B if
and only if f is quasi-relation between A and B such that for every u ∈ A there is
a v ∈ B such that if 〈u, v〉 ∈ f and 〈w, z〉 ∈ f and u ≡ w then v ≡ z.
What this definition grants us is that a quasi-function maps indistinguishable ele-
ments to indistinguishable elements. For classical objects, both quasi-relations and
quasi-functions coincide with the classical definitions. With some restrictions, one
can also define the concepts of injection, surjection and bijection, but we shall not
present those definitions here (see [10, chap. 7]).
Another important concept in Q concerns the attribution of cardinality to q-sets.
Since collections having m-atoms as elements cannot be well-ordered (for that con-
cept also presupposes identity), one cannot proceed in the usual ways to grant that
every q-set will have a cardinal number associated to it, for example, through the
attribution of ordinals following the well-known von Neumann definition. The usual
strategy has been to adopt a primitive concept of quasi-cardinal which generalizes
the classical notion of cardinal: in the classical part of quasi-set theory one builds
cardinals, as usual, and then, with the primitive quasi-function qc one attributes
cardinals to every q-set, making sure that classical sets will have as their quasi-
cardinal (the cardinal attributed by qc) precisely the same cardinal attributed to
them in the classical part of the theory.
The notion of quasi-cardinal also allows us to obtain in Q another interesting con-
cept: the strong singleton. As we have seen, given any object x whatever we may
obtain the weak singleton of x, a q-set which in the case of x being an m-atom may
have quasi-cardinal greater than 1. The strong singleton of x relative to a q-set w,
denoted by JxKw is simply a q-set containing an element that is indistinguishable
from x which belong to w and whose quasi-cardinal is precisely 1. With the re-
sources of Q however, if x is an m-atom one cannot deduce that x is precisely the
only element of JxKw , for identity must be used for that. So, we can reason within
Q that we may have in JxKw an m-atom having determinate properties, without
being able to specify which particular one it is.
The following theorem expresses the invariance by permutations in Q, a result we
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shall employ below5:
Theorem 4.1 (Unobservability of Permutations) Let x be a finite q-set such
that ¬(x = [z]t) for some t and let z be an m-atom such that z ∈ x. If w ∈ t, w ≡ z
and w /∈ x, then there exists JwKt such that
(x− JzKt) ∪ JwKt ≡ x
In words: two indiscernible elements z and w, with z ∈ x and w /∈ x, expressed by
their strong-singletons JtKt and JwKt, are ‘permuted’ and the resulting q-set remains
indiscernible from the original one. The hypothesis that ¬(x = [z]t) grants that
there are in t indiscernible elements from z which do not belong to x (for details
and the proof of the Unobservability of Permutations theorem, see [10, pp.295,296]).
These are the central notions that will be important in our development ofQ-spaces,
to which we now turn below.
4.2 Quasi-functions
From now on, we shall follow [7], where further details can be seen. We begin
with a q-set of real numbers ǫ = {ǫi}i∈I , where I is an arbitrary collection of
indexes, denumerable or not. Since it is a collection of real numbers, which may be
constructed in the classical part of Q we have that Z(ǫ). Intuitively, the elements
ǫi represent the eigenvalues of a physical observable Oˆ, that is, they are the values
such that Oˆ|ϕi〉 = ǫi|ϕi〉, with |ϕi〉 the corresponding eigenstates. The fact that the
observables are Hermitian operators grants us that the eigenvalues are real numbers,
thus we are justified in assuming ǫ to be a set of real numbers. Consider then the
quasi-functions f : ǫ −→ Fp, where Fp is the quasi-set formed of all finite and
pure quasi-sets (that is, finite quasi-sets whose only elements are indistinguishable
m-atoms). Each of these f is a q-set of ordered pairs 〈ǫi, x〉 with ǫi ∈ ǫ and x ∈ Fp.
From Fp we select those quasi-functions f which attribute a non-empty q-set only
to a finite number of elements of ǫ, the image of f being ∅ for the other cases.
We call F the quasi-set containing only these quasi-functions. Then, the quasi-
cardinal of most of the q-sets attributed to elements of ǫ according to these quasi-
functions is 0. Now, elements of F are quasi-functions which we read as attributing
to each ǫi a q-set whose quasi-cardinal we take to be the occupation number of this
eigenvalue. We write these quasi-functions as fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫim . According to the given
intuitive interpretation, the levels ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫim are occupied. We say that if the
symbol ǫik appears j-times, then the level ǫik has occupation number j. For example,
the notation fǫ1ǫ1ǫ1ǫ2ǫ3 means that the level ǫ1 has occupation number 3 while the
levels ǫ2 and ǫ3 have occupation numbers 1. The levels that do not appear have
occupation number zero. Another point to be remarked is that since the elements
of ǫ are real numbers, we can take the standard ordering relation over the reals and
order the indexes according to this ordering in the representation fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫim . This
will be important when we consider the cases for bosons and fermions.
The quasi-functions of F provide the key to the solution to the problem of labeling
states. In fact, since we use pure quasi-sets as the images of the quasi-functions,
5. Recall the motivations for our development of quantum mechanics inside Q: we want to use the
features of non-individuals that are encapsulated in quasi-set theory to somehow obtain quantum
theory
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there is simply no question of indexes for particles, for all that matters are the quasi-
cardinals representing the occupation numbers. To make it clear that permutations
change nothing, one needs only to notice that a quasi-function is a q-set of weak
ordered pairs (see definitions 4.2 and 4.5). Taking two of the pairs belonging to some
quasi-function, let us say 〈ǫi, x〉, 〈ǫj, y〉, with both x and y non-empty, a permuta-
tion of particles would consist in changing elements from x with elements from y.
But, by the unobservability of permutations theorem 4.1, what we obtain after the
permutation is a q-set indistinguishable from the one we began with. Remember
also that a quasi-function attributes indistinguishable images to indistinguishable
items; thus, the indistinguishable q-set resulting from the permutations will also be
in the image of the same eigenvalue. To show this point precisely, we recall that
by definition 〈ǫi, x〉 abbreviates [[ǫi], [ǫi, x]],6 and an analogous expression holds for
〈ǫj , y〉. Also by definition, [ǫi, x] is the collection of all the items indistinguishable
from ǫi or from x (taken from a previously given q-set). For this reason, if we per-
mute x with x′, with x ≡ x′ we change nothing for [ǫi, x] ≡ [ǫi, x′]. Thus, we obtain
〈ǫi, x〉 ≡ 〈ǫi, x′〉 and the ordered pairs of the ‘permuted’ quasi-function will be in-
discernible (the same if there are no m-atoms involved). Thus, the permutation of
indistinguishable elements does not produce changes in the quasi-functions.
4.3 A Vector Space Structure
Now, we wish to have a vector space structure to represent quantum states. To do
that, we need to define addition and multiplication by scalars. Before we go on,
we must notice that we cannot define these operations directly on the q-set F , for
there is no simple way to endow it with the required structure; our strategy here is
to define ⋆ (multiplication by scalars) and + (addition of vectors) in a q-set whose
vectors will be quasi-functions from F to the set of complex numbers C. Let us call
C the collection of quasi-functions which assign to every f ∈ F a complex number.
Once again, we select from C the sub-collection CF of quasi-functions c such that
every c ∈ CF attributes complex numbers λ 6= 0 for only a finite number of f ∈ F .
Over CF we can define a sum and a product by scalars in the same way as it is
usually done with functions as follows.
Definition 4.6 Let γ ∈ C, and c, c1 and c2 be quasi-functions of CF , then
(γ ⋆ c)(f) := γ(c(f))
(c1 + c2)(f) := c1(f) + c2(f)
The quasi-function c0 ∈ CF such that c0(f) = 0 for every f ∈ F acts as the null
element for the sum operation. This can be shown as follows:
(c0 + c)(f) = c0(f) + c(f) = 0 + c(f) = c(f), ∀f. (3)
With both the operations of sum and multiplication by scalars defined as above
we have that 〈CF ,C,+, ⋆〉 has the structure of a complex vector space, as one can
easily check. Some of the elements of CF have a special status though; if cj ∈ CF are
the quasi-functions such that cj(fi) = δij (where δij is the Kronecker symbol), then
6. We are leaving aside the subindices in this notation.
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the vectors cj are called the basis vectors, while the others are linear combinations
of them. For notational convenience, we can introduce a new notation for the q-
functions in CF ; suppose c attributes a λ 6= 0 to some f , and 0 to every other
quasi-function in F . Then, we propose to denote c by λf . The basis quasi-functions
will be denoted simply fi, as one can check. Now, multiplication by scalar α of one
of these quasi-functions, say λfi can be read simply as (α · λ)fi, and sum of quasi-
functions λfi and αfi can be read as (α+λ)fi. What about the other quasi-functions
in CF ? We can extend this idea to them too, but with some care: if, for example
c0 is a quasi-function such that c0(fi) = α and c0(fj) = λ, attributing 0 to every
other quasi-function in F , then c0 can be seen as a linear combination of quasi-
functions of a basis; in fact, consider the basis quasi-functions fi and fj , (this is an
abuse of notation, for they are representing quasi-functions in CF that attribute 1
to each of these quasi-functions). The first step consists in multiplying them by α
and λ, respectively, obtaining αfi and λfj (once again, this is an abuse, for these
are quasi-functions in CF that attribute the mentioned complex numbers to fi and
to fj). Now, c0 is in fact the sum of these quasi-functions, that is, c0 = αfi + λfj ,
for this is the function which does exactly what c0 does. One can then extend this
to all the other quasi-functions in CF as well.
4.4 Inner Products
The next step in our construction is to endow our vector space with an inner prod-
uct. This is a necessary step for we wish to calculate probabilities and mean values.
Following the idea proposed in [7], we introduce two kinds of inner products, which
lead us to two Hilbert spaces, one for bosons and another for fermions. We begin
with the case for bosons:
Definition 4.7 Let δij be the Kronecker symbol and fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin and fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′
m
two basis vectors (as discussed above), then
fǫi1 ǫi2 ...ǫin ◦ fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′
m
:= δnm
∑
p
δi1pi′1δi2pi′2 . . . δinpi′n . (4)
Notice that this sum is extended over all the permutations of the index set i′ =
(i′1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
n); for each permutation p, pi
′ = (pi′1, pi
′
2, . . . , pi
′
n).
For the other vectors, the ones that can be seen as linear combinations in the sense
discussed above, we have:
(
∑
k
αkfk) ◦ (
∑
k
α′kf
′
k) :=
∑
kj
α∗kα
′
j(fk ◦ f ′j), (5)
where α∗ is the complex conjugate of α. Now, let us consider fermions. As remarked
above in page 12, the order of the indexes in each fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin is determined by the
canonical ordering in the real numbers. Thus, we define another “•” inner product
as follows, which will do the job for fermions:
Definition 4.8 Let δij be the Kronecker symbol and fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin and fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′
m
two basis vectors, then
fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin • fǫi′
1
ǫ
i′
2
...ǫ
i′
m
:= δnm
∑
p
σpδi1pi′1δi2pi′2 . . . δinpi′n (6)
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where: σp = 1 if p is even and σp = −1 if p is odd.
This definition can be extended to linear combinations as in the previous case.
4.5 Fock spaces using Q-spaces
We begin with a definition to simplify the notation. For every function fǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin
in F , we put:
α|ǫi1ǫi2 . . . ǫin) := αfǫi1ǫi2 ...ǫin
Note that this is a slight modified version of the standard notation. We begin with
the case of bosons.
Suppose a normalized vector |αβγ . . .), where the norm is taken from the corre-
sponding inner product. Let ζ stand for an arbitrary collection of indexes. We define
a†α|ζ) ∝ |αζ) in such a way that the proportionality constant satisfies a†αaα|ζ) =
nα|ζ). From this it will follow, as usual, that:
((ζ|a†α)(aα|ζ)) = nα.
Definition 4.9 aα| . . . nα . . .) := √nα| . . . nα − 1 . . .)
On the other hand
aαa
†
α| . . . nα . . .) = K
√
nα + 1| . . . nα . . .),
where K is a proportionality constant. Applying a†α again, we have
a†αaαa
†
α| . . . nα . . .) = K2
√
nα + 1| . . . nα + 1 . . .).
Using the fact that a†αaα|ζ) = nα|ζ), we have that:
(a†αaα)a
†
α| . . . nα . . .) =
√
nα + 1K| . . . nα + 1 . . .).
So, K =
√
nα + 1.
Then, we have:
Definition 4.10 a†α| . . . nα . . .) :=
√
nα + 1| . . . nα + 1 . . .).
From this definition, with additional computations, we obtain: (aαa
†
β − a†βaα)|ψ) =
δαβ|ψ). In our language, this means the same as
[aα; a
†
β ] = δαβI.
In an analogous way, it can be shown that:
[aα; aβ] = [a
†
α; a
†
β ] = 0.
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So, the bosonic commutation relation are the same as in standard Fock space for-
malism.
For fermionic states we use the antisymmetric product •. We begin by defining the
creation operator C†α:
Definition 4.11 If ζ is a collection of indexes of non-null occupation numbers,
then C†α := α|ζ)
If α is in ζ, then |αζ) is a vector of null norm. This implies that (ψ|αζ) = 0, for
every ψ. It follows that systems in states of null norm have no probability of being
observed. Furthermore, their addition to another vector does not contribute with
any observable difference. To take the situation into account, we define:
Definition 4.12 Two vectors |φ) and |ψ) are similar if the difference between them
is a linear combination of null norm vectors. We denote similarity of |φ) and |ψ) by
|φ) ∼= |ψ).
Using the definition of C†α we can describe what is the effect of Cα over vectors:
(ζ|Cα := (αζ|.
Then, for any vector |ψ),
(ζ|Cα|ψ) = (αζ|ψ) = 0
for α ∈ ζ or (ψ|αζ) = 0. Then, if |ψ) = |0), then (ζ|Cα|0) = (αζ|0) = 0. So,
Cα|0) is orthogonal to any vector that contais α, and also to any vector that does
not contain α, so that it is a linear combination of null norm vectors. So, we can
put by definition that ~0 := Cα|0). In an analogous way, if ∼ α denotes that α has
occupation number zero, then we can also write Cα|(∼ α) . . .) = ~0, where the dots
mean that other levels have arbitrary occupation numbers.
Now, using our notion of similar vectors, we can write Cα|0) ∼= ~0 and Cα|(∼ α) . . .) ∼=
~0. The same results are obtained when we use ∼= and the sign of identity. By making
|ψ) = |α), we have (ζ|Cα|α) = (αζ|α) = 0 in every case, except when |ζ) = |0). In
that case, (0|Cα|α) = 1. Then, it follows that Cα|α) ∼= 0. In an analogous way, we
obtain Cα|αζ) =∼= |(∼ α)ζ) when α /∈ ζ. In the case α ∈ ζ, |αζ) has null norm, and
so, for every |ψ):
(αζ|C†α|ψ) = (αζ|αψ) = 0.
It then follows that
(ψ|Cα|αζ) = 0,
so that Cα|αζ) has null norm too.
Now we calculate the anti-commutation relation obeyed by the fermionic creation
and annihilation operators. We begin calculating the commutation relation between
Cα and C
†
β . We do that by studying the relationship between |αβ) and |βα). Let us
consider the sum |αβ)+ |βα). The product of this sum with any vector distinct from
|αβ) is null. For the product with |αβ) we obtain (αβ|[|αβ) + |βα)] = (αβ||αβ) +
(αβ||βα). By definition, this is equal to δααδββ − δαβδβα + δαβδαα − δααδββ. This
is equal to 1− 0 + 0− 1 = 0.
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The same conclusion holds if we multiply the sum |αβ) + |βα) by (βα|. It then
follows that |αβ) + |βα) is a linear combination of null norm vectors, which we
denote by |nn), so that
|αβ) = −|βα) + |nn).
Given that, we can calculate
C†αC
†
β |ψ) = |αβψ) = −|βα|ψ) + |nn) = −C†βC†α|ψ) + |nn).
From this it follows that {C†α;C†β}|ψ) = |nn). We do not lose generality by setting
{C†α;C†β}|ψ) = 0. In an analogous way we conclude:
{Cα;Cβ}|ψ) = 0.
Now we calculate the commutation relation between Cα and C
†
β . There are some
cases to be considered. We first assume that α 6= β. If α /∈ ψ or β ∈ ψ then
{Cα;C†β}|ψ) ≈ ~0.
If α ∈ ψ and β /∈ ψ, assuming that α is the first symbol in the list of ψ, then
{Cα;C†β}|ψ) = Cα|βψ) + C†β |ψ(∼ α)) ∼= −|βψ(∼ α)) + |βψ(∼ α)) = ~0.
Now, if α = β and α ∈ ψ, then {Cα;C†α}|ψ) = Cα|αψ)+C†α|ψ(∼ α)) ∼= ~0+|ψ) = |ψ).
If α = β and α /∈ ψ, then {Cα;C†α}|ψ) = Cα|αψ) + C†α|ψ(∼ α)) ∼= |ψ) + ~0 = |ψ).
In any case, we recover {Cα;C†α}|ψ) ∼= δαβ |ψ). So, we can put
{Cα;C†α} = δαβ .
It then follows that the commutation properties in Q-spaces are the same as in
traditional Fock spaces.
Using this formalism, we can adapt all the developments done in [18, Chap.7] and
[19, Chap.20] for the number occupation formalism. But here, contrary to what
happens in these books, no previous (even unconscious) assumptions about the
individuality of quantum objects is taken into account.
5 Foundational and metaphysical remarks
Now that a non-standard version of quantum mechanics was sketched inside quasi-
set theory, what are the main philosophical lessons that one can draw from this
whole enterprise? Are we supposed to substitute traditional quantum mechanics
by its nonreflexive version? The answer to the last question is an obvious NO, or
not necessarily. What is illustrated by this construction is only that one can take
a version of non-individuality seriously and, building from there, to develop the
formalism of quantum mechanics anew, without labeling and individuality. We re-
mark once again that in using standard mathematics (standard set theory), we
need to assume that the represented objects are individuals at the start, and need
to make some mathematical tricks in order to keep them with something that mimic
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non-individuality. Once indiscernible non-individuals are essential to quantum me-
chanics, our move illustrates that one can assume non-individuality and indistin-
guishability as central in a formalism and, along with some set theoretical tools
compatible with such non-individuality (i.e. quasi-set theory), derive a version of
the formalism of the theory.
This kind of move illustrates how one may profitably approach the cooperative
work between the study of foundations of science and metaphysics. Metaphysics
may be seen as contributing positively to the foundations of a scientific theory like
quantum mechanics, by suggesting that due to the main features of the theory, we
are dealing with a new category of entities, the non-individuals. Metaphysicians
are entitled to describe the main metaphysical features that entities qualified as
non-individuals could have. By searching for the logic that adequately describes
those entities we are led to the development of Q-spaces. Quantum mechanics, on
its own side, contributes to the development of metaphysics. By being our most
successful theory, and by putting so much weight on indiscernible entities, it forces
metaphysicians to develop an adequate notion of non-individuals and indiscernible
entities compatible with the description provided by quantum mechanics.
What we aim now is to present how we understand this kind of collaboration be-
tween science and metaphysics in a more general picture. The following may be seen
as a rudimentary approach to how a productive relation between science and meta-
physics may be developed which does not focus only on science (such as Ladyman
and Ross do in [17]) and also does not rely so heavily on what metaphysicians have
already achieved (as it seems to be the case of French’s approach in [9, chap.3]). We
intend to present how a really collaborative effort to understand quantum meta-
physics, for instance, may proceed. This is not achieved by adopting neither a
‘physics first’ approach, and nor by providing a ‘metaphysics first’ approach. Both
physics and metaphysics must be cooperatively involved in the enterprise. The ‘di-
alectics’ of such a cooperation may be roughly described as a case of a process
aiming at a state of Reflective Equilibrium. Let us see briefly how.
We begin, as usual, with an actually available formulation of our scientific theory;
in this case, quantum mechanics. In general there is an informal interpretation
of the theory. Anyway, the mathematics of the theory may give us some clues as
to how the entities being described behave. In general, we simply talk about the
entities described by the theory by transferring our everyday categories of stable
objects, properties, relations and things in general to the domain being described
by the scientific theory. What our most successful theories in the beginning of the
twentieth century have shown us is that this transference is not always justified.
General relativity, for instance, demanded for a revision in our concepts of space
and time, while quantum mechanics demanded a revision of many other concepts
as well, such as stable objects possessing properties and having well defined identity
conditions (it is enough to recall some no-go theorems like Kochen-Specker’s and
Bell’s). That such is the case is, as is well-known, the main contention of Ladyman
and Ross in [17, Chap.1]: metaphysicians have not yet taken seriously the lessons
from modern physics.
However, after perceiving that a scientific theory demands a revision in some funda-
mental concepts, what are metaphysicians supposed to do? In the case of quantum
mechanics, in the specific case of non-individuals, how can we rigorously describe
the situation? Well, we must first recognize that the mathematical apparatus em-
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ployed to describe the theory encapsulates some of the items requiring revision, like
labeling and identity. So, how should we proceed? Just as suggested by French [9]
with his viking approach to metaphysics, we may check what the metaphysicians can
say about the new kind of entities. Have they already articulated a theory about the
behavior of those entities? If they have, do those entities, thus categorized, mesh
well with what the scientific theory says about the world? In the case of quantum
entities, it seems, as we have argued in sections 3 and 2, the metaphysical ideas of
non-individuals, of indiscernible classes of entities, do not fit very well with some of
the assumptions that are encoded in the standard formalism of the theory. So, in
this case, the search for an alternative logical foundations is a first required step.
Our suggestion is that we could then use the information brought by the scientific
theory to develop a new logic, a logic that already encodes the basic information
about the entities dealt with. Nonreflexive logics do just that, as we have briefly
sketched in the beginning of section 4. So, we use the actual formulation of a theory
in order to discover what are the main features of the entities being dealt with. In
case those features demand a revision of some of our most general categories, then
we have at least two options: either (i) we reformulate the theory in order to keep the
traditional categories as much as possible (as it happens for instance, in Bohmian
mechanics) while still retaining empirical adequacy, or else (ii) we try to take those
novelties seriously, at face value as it were, and look for the best place to implement
them. Given that the idea of non-individuals, as we have been dealing with them,
is a general category, related with identity, it seemed that the underlying logic was
the most appropriate place to introduce that category. Also, that change of view
proved to be very fruitful: we could not only account for the non-individuality of
quantum particles, but also show how that non-individuality is able to generate a
formalism of quantum mechanics anew! Another way to account for the novelties,
still concerning this second case, is not to change the formalism or the logic, but to
keep the mathematics of the theory intact and provide for an interpretation of the
formalism that somehow accounts for the novelties of the theory. One of such options
is now known as wave function realism. The main idea behind this interpretation
seems to be that the wave function of the mathematical formalism is the reality
of which the theory is about. In this case, the very concept of ordinary space is
to be completely redefined, along with the concept of three dimensional objects.
Even though this is an interesting approach, we shall not discuss it in what follows,
keeping our focus on the notion of non-individuality (for more on wave function
realism, see the discussion in the collection by Alyssa Ney and David Albert [20],
[13]).
So, by reformulating the formalism of Fock spaces in terms ofQ-spaces, we are doing
much more than merely paying lip service the a revisionary form of metaphysics:
we show, somehow, that the concept of a non-individual is fundamental in at least
one understanding of quantum mechanics. This is different from, for instance, the
claim that some kind of paraconsistent logic may be useful for our understanding
of quantum superpositions (as advanced in [5]; see also the discussion in [3]). In
this case, one interprets a physical fact in logico-metaphysical terms. Our claim is
that the nonreflexive foundations of quantum mechanics developed here go one step
further: we do not merely take the claims of quantum theory and re-interpret them
in a non-classical logic system, but we begin with the non-classical system and inside
it we develop the scientific theory itself. So, by reading some of the main features of
the entities dealt with by the theory, we are able to use now those very features as
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the cornerstones for a new formulation of the theory, one that takes those features
as central. This move closes a kind of circle: from a standard formulation of the
theory we obtain some metaphysical feature of the entities. By laboring over those
features, we develop a metaphysical approach to them that is rigorous enough to
be encapsulated by a system of logic. Finally, by employing that system of logic we
are able to develop a formalism that is able to express the theory.
Perhaps we could describe the kind of procedure developed here with the help
of an analogy with the situation in foundations of mathematics, as presented by
Kunen [15, p.191]. In discussing the foundations of mathematics, Kunen claims
that logic must be developed twice: we begin with our intuitions and intuitive rules
of inference and, based solely on them, develop an informal set theory. Obviously,
some logic is required in order to develop a set theory, and in the case of standard
set theories this logic is informal classical logic. Now, inside the set theory we have
just developed, we can begin anew and develop, in a completely rigorous way, using
set theoretical tools, our very system of logic. Now, inside such a set theory can we
make sure that a reasonable model theory, for instance, is available. So, logic must
be built twice: first, as an informal system, capable of grounding the development
of a set theory and such that it does not presuppose set theoretical concepts in its
formulation. Then, inside the just developed set theory, we can develop, as a set
theoretical entity, logic itself. In the second case, the tools of set theory are clearly
available, and rigorous research is possible (for a discussion of that move concerning
nonreflexive logic, see [2] and [1]).
A similar situation happens in the metaphysical foundations of quantum mechanics
we have advanced. We begin with our intuitive conceptual apparatus, good enough
for our everyday working of prediction and development of the theory. Perhaps that
apparatus comprises a minimal constructive logic (as suggested by da Costa [4],
such a logic would have the minimum for our actual development of science). With
that apparatus we can develop logic and the mathematics required for quantum
mechanics. Now, as we have discussed, quantum mechanics seems to demand a re-
vision of the apparatus we began with.7 Logic must be built again. Now, however,
differently from Kunen’s description of the situation in mathematics, a new sys-
tem of logic must be developed, not inside a classical set theory, but totally new,
from scratch, taking into account the lessons from science. This is what we have at-
tempted to provide here in the case of non-individuals. Obviously we do not require
that every field of knowledge take nonreflexive logic into account; no, our everyday
activities are rooted on our everyday experiences, for which identity does not seem
to be eliminable, at least by this time. That can be interpreted in two ways: either
nonreflexive logics takes the place of classical logic everywhere, with the proviso
that it is the ‘classical’ part of Q that is being used, or else one accepts a pluralism
in logic, claiming that distinct fields of knowledge demand distinct systems of logic.
That is a interesting debate, but we shall not face it now.
Suffice to say, for now, that the construction of Q-spaces is only a beginning to the
study of the non-reflexive foundations of quantum mechanics. Nonreflexive logics
still present philosophical challenges and advance some interesting problems in the
foundations of quantum mechanics. It is up to us to develop those systems and
discover whether the system can face the challenges.
7. Again, see the discussion in [14] for further information on those issues.
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